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11. Introduction
Do the labour market conditions that the young encounter when they first leave school play an
important role in initiating and forming criminal careers? Think of two otherwise identical school
leavers who left high school in 2010 – one in North Dakota and the other in Michigan. Both have
completed education and try to get a job. But the North Dakota school leaver faced a state
unemployment rate of only 3.8 percent, while it was 12.7 percent in Michigan. At the margin, the
Michigan youngster is more likely to proceed down the wrong path – no luck getting a job, no
welfare to fall back on, hanging out with similarly unfortunate juveniles, trouble with the police,
some petty larceny and so on – than the North Dakota youngster. Indeed this is just the standard
Becker (1968) model in action. As youths leave school, they face a trade-off between legal and
illegal activities. At higher unemployment rates, the expected returns to legal activity (i.e. work)
fall. All else equal, this encourages some youths to commit crime that would otherwise have
successfully avoided such a result in a more buoyant labour market.
But what might happen as these same youngsters age? Two obvious mechanisms now link
their experience straight out of high school with later ones. First, earlier experiences of crime can
increase their stock of criminal knowledge and potentially reduce the costs of participating in
subsequent criminal activity. Second, a previous criminal record (and less on-the-job human
capital accumulation) may reduce the expected wage in the legal labour market. Both effects can
be expected to increase the likelihood that the individual eventually becomes a career criminal.
There is a substantial body of criminological evidence that points to the importance of the
experience of youths for understanding crime patterns. Almost two hundred years ago, Adolphe
Quetelet showed that crime in early nineteenth-century France peaked when individuals were in
their late teens (Quetelet, 1831). Subsequent research has confirmed the strong age-crime pattern,
2with crime peaking in the late teens and declining quite rapidly.1 Unsurprisingly in our data, the
same patterns emerge. Figure 1 plots the average male offender rate by age for the US and UK
from 2000-2010.2 The peak occurs at age 17 or 18 and declines reasonably smoothly from then
on. Note however that the offender rate at age 29 is still a lot higher than at age 39 – criminality
is not just a feature of teenage years.
Existing evidence also points to strong links between criminality in teenage years and
subsequent criminal behaviour. In our data for example, 72 percent of males aged over 25 in the
UK who were convicted of a crime in 2002 had a criminal record that went back to their teenage
years. Thus factors that increase criminal behaviour for juveniles have scope to raise the lifetime
criminal participation rate. The focus of this paper is whether the state of the labour market at
entry is such a factor.
Our analysis contributes to two distinct strands of literature. First, there has been an
extensive, though partly unresolved, debate over the link between recessions and crime. This
literature has primarily focused on the issue of whether crime rates, and in particular property
crime rates, are countercyclical. The evidence tends to suggest that the place where one can
identify effects from unemployment to crime is for young adults.3 Thus, Gould, Weinberg and
Mustard (2002) examine the impact of contemporaneous unemployment and wages on the
criminal behavior of less educated young males. Exploiting a panel of US counties, they find
significant effects for both wages and unemployment on property and violent crime. Fougère et
al. (2009) find strong effects from youth unemployment (but not overall unemployment) on crime
1 See Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983) for the development of the formulation that crime-age profiles are invariant
over time and space, and the subsequent body of research trying to refute this claim that followed (for example,
Greenberg, 1985, Hansen, 2003, and the meta-study of Pratt and Cullen, 2000).
2 Full details on the data used in the chart are provided in Section 3 and the Data Appendix. The chart shows the
average offender rate (arrested in US and convicted in UK), defined as the number of offenders in each age group
divided by population in each age group. The data is averaged over the period 2000-2010.
3 Indeed, Freeman’s (1999) survey notes the relationship across the whole population to be ‘fragile, at best’.
3in France, while Grönqvist (2013) uses Swedish register data to show a strong and precisely
estimated link between youth unemployment and crime, both for property and violent crimes.
Second, there is a growing literature (from Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991, onwards) on the
effects of first entering the labour market during recessions on outcomes later in life. That
literature so far has focused on whether such workers experience sustained long-run negative
consequences. Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012) exploit a large Canadian longitudinal
dataset to show that the cost of a recession for new graduates is substantial and long lasting. A
typical recession – a 5 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate – is associated with an
initial loss of earnings of about 9 percent that halves within 5 years, and finally fades to zero by
10 years. The economic mechanism operates via initial placements with lower paying employers
and succeeding recoveries through gradual job mobility to better firms. Graduates in the lower
quintile of the ability distribution suffer permanently lower wages, while the more able graduates
quickly bounce back. Similar results are reported by Kahn (2010) who uses longitudinal data on
US college graduates, though some of her results suggest that the wage penalty is longer lasting.
By contrast, Benedetto, Gathright and Stinson (2010) find no evidence of a persistent impact of
graduation-year unemployment on earnings using US social security earnings data. Taking a
somewhat different approach, Oyer (2006, 2008) has examined the career paths of particular
occupations, namely economists and investment bankers, to assess the importance of initial
conditions. He shows that stock market conditions at the time of graduation have a strong effect
on whether MBA students go directly to Wall Street, or instead pursue alternatives such as jobs
in consulting firms. Further, he shows that starting a career in investment banking directly after
graduation causes a person to be more likely to stay in the job and earn significantly more. These
effects are substantial in size, amounting to several million dollars in present value.
4Outside of the labour market literature, labour market entry conditions have been shown to
impact other outcomes. MacLean (2013), for example, finds that males who graduate from high
school during a recession show worse health outcomes at age forty than those graduating in a
more auspicious labour market. This is true for both self-reported health measures and objective
measures of physical and mental health. Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) show that those who
enter the labour market in recession are more likely to believe that success in life depends more
on luck than effort and support more government redistribution. Again, these effects are seen to
be long lasting. The protective effect of education for cohorts who graduate in recessions is
studied by Cutler et al. (2014) in their analysis of Eurobarometer data. They report evidence of
lower wages and life satisfaction together with higher obesity and a greater propensity to smoke
and drink later in life for individuals who graduate in recession years, with higher education
levels significantly moderating these negative outcomes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss possible links
between initial conditions at labour market entry and the future path of criminal behavior as well
as the underlying dynamics to motivate our empirical research. In Section 3 we discuss the
empirical strategy and data for the US and UK. We present individual-level evidence and cohort
panel results in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes by summarising the key
findings of the paper.
2. Theoretical Background
In the standard Becker (1968) static economics of crime model, individuals act as rational
decision makers and choose between legal and illegal activity. Their choice is based on the
expected returns to both options. In this simple yet powerful framework, returns to legal activity
5are solely determined by the market earnings from employment whereas returns to illegal activity
take into account the potential crime payoff, the probability of getting caught and the expected
sanction if caught. If the expected return to illegal activity outweighs the expected return to legal
activity, the individual chooses to commit crime.
In that model, higher unemployment reduces the returns to legal activity. Thus, individuals
facing unemployment or higher risk of unemployment may become more likely to commit crime
than they would have been otherwise. That effect is expected to be higher for young people who
typically are less attached to the legal labour market than older individuals further on in their
careers.
The model has proved valuable in highlighting the economic incentives associated with
criminal activity and its basic predictions on incentive and deterrence effects on crime has
received substantial empirical support (see the reviews of Freeman, 1999, the introduction of
Cook at al., 2013, and Chalfin and McCrary, 2014). Its weakness and limitation for our purposes
is that it is explicitly static. Individuals make a one-off decision to commit crime or work in the
legal sector. There is no process through which decisions made in the current period have
implications both for future decisions and for the choices available to the individual in later
periods.
Mocan et al. (2005) develop a dynamic model that links recessions, human capital and
crime. Individuals are lifetime utility maximizers where the source of utility from consumption
and income comes from both the legal and the criminal sector. Individuals have endowments of
legal and criminal human capital, which depreciate over time. Both types of human capital rise
with experience in the sector and are increased by investment in the respective sectors. The
individual’s income is a function of human capital and rates of return in the both sectors. In each
6period, the individual solves a dynamic stochastic optimization problem. First, they decide how
much time to allocate to legal and criminal work and second, they decide on the optimal level of
consumption.
Crime is risky in the sense that a criminal faces a certain probability of being caught and
sent to prison. The probability of prison depends on the skill of the criminal as measured by
criminal human capital and the amount of time spent in the criminal sector as measured by
experience in the sector. While legal human capital may decline in prison in addition to
depreciation effects, for example due to reputation effects, criminal human capital may increase if
criminals in prison learn from each other.
In this model, recessions impact on crime through the dynamic evolution of both legal and
criminal human capital. In that sense, the long-term impact of recessions on crime differs with the
length and the depth of a recession. In a recession, the returns to legal human capital fall.
Following the arguments from the standard Becker (1968) model, involvement in criminal
activity rises depending on the relative and absolute returns to crime. If involvement in criminal
activity increases, the criminal human capital stock is expected to grow while the legal human
capital stock depreciates. Once the recession ends, returns to legal human capital increase again,
and the relative returns to criminal activity decrease. In a short recession, the stock of legal
human capital typically remains significantly higher than the stock of criminal human capital, and
the individual exits the criminal sector. Basically, in such a short recession, the individual is
encouraged to get involved in criminal activity, but is not exposed to these conditions for a long
enough period to develop sufficient criminal capital in order to yield higher returns in the crime
market than in the legal market once the recession ends.
7If an individual is exposed to a long recession, the decision between legal and illegal
activity changes in the same way as in a short recession. However, the individual’s criminal
human capital stock grows over a longer time period whereas the legal human capital stock is
expected to decline even more than in a shorter recession. These two effects may result in higher
returns to criminal activity than to legal activity even after the recession ends. We expect more
permanent effects of a recession on criminal behaviour in that case. In addition, with higher
involvement in criminal activity, the chances of being caught and imprisoned may rise. As
explained above, if imprisoned, an individual’s criminal human capital stock may rise further in
absolute terms, and certainly rises further relative to legal human capital. In that situation
hysteresis can occur and trigger criminal careers.
The mechanisms explained above are likely to be stronger for these individuals with
initially low levels of legal human capital. New entrants to the labour market have developed less
legal human capital and thus are less attached to the legal labour market. In our empirical
analysis, we thus look at cohorts entering the labour market in different economic conditions and
estimate the effect of entering the labour market in a recession on subsequent crime outcomes.
In the criminology literature there has been extensive focus on the concept of a criminal
career and how it develops with age (see Piquero et al., 2003). A criminal career is often
characterised by various stages: onset, persistence, escalation/specialization and desistance. 4
Sampson and Laub (1993, 2005) characterize crime as a product of persistent individual
differences and local life events. They find that incarceration in later life is strongly related to the
difficulty in securing stable work as individuals entered young adulthood.
4 Criminological research that focusses on specific stages includes Eggleston et al. (2002), Elliott (1994) and McGee
and Farrington (2010).
8Our research question of whether labour market entry conditions matter for crime fits
naturally into this framework. Unemployment at labour market entry (a local life event) can
contribute to the onset of criminal behaviour and/or can encourage the persistence of those youths
that have already begun a criminal career. The long-run effect of unemployment at labour market
entry then depends on the persistence and desistance effects. There has been less research on the
duration of criminal careers. One study (Piquero et al., 2003) finds that, for offenders with two or
more offences, the average duration of criminal careers was 10.4 years.
In the discussion thus far we have implicitly assumed that unemployment at labour market
entry causes the criminal career to begin at that point (or to intensify for those youths already
active in crime). A complementary alternative would be that entry unemployment could have
delayed effects on criminal behaviour. Zara and Farrington (2010) study a group of late-onset
offenders (those who commit their first crime aged 21 or over). They find a significant effect of
high unemployment at age 16-18 as a predictor of subsequent offending (relative to a non-
offending control group). To address this, in our empirical approach we consider differential
timing of the effects of labour market entry unemployment effects on crime.
3. Empirical Strategy and Data
Basic Data Description and Modelling Approach
Our empirical analysis exploits both individual micro-level data and panel data on year-of-birth
cohorts over state and time. The data are discussed in more detail below and in the Data
Appendix. For the microdata we observe cross-sections of individuals and can identify those who
are incarcerated (US) and those who report having ever been arrested (UK). For each individual
we can match in the unemployment rate at their time of labour market entry in the area they live
9and estimate probability models to explore whether this has an effect on criminal outcomes in
later life.
For the panel data, we observe age/birth cohorts as they enter the labour market and follow
them through the first 23 years of their working life. Our unit of analysis is defined at the year-of-
birth cohort (c), region (r), and calendar year (t) level where region refers to states in the US and
to standard regions in the UK. We can estimate the long-run effects of initial labour market
conditions by exploiting the regional variation in entry unemployment rates across cohorts using
the following equation:
crtεcrtγXLMEcr,βUrateg(a)tαrαcαcrtln(crime)  (1)
In (1), cohort, region and time fixed effects are denoted by αc, αr, and αt respectively, X is a set of
control variables (defined below) and ε is an error term. LME denotes that the cohort-region 
specific unemployment rate is dated at the time of labour market entry.
There are several pertinent features of (1). First, one cannot separately identify age, cohort
and time effects. Thus we start by placing more structure on this, exploiting the well-known
shape of crime-age profiles and specifying the age effect as a quartic function in age, g(a), and
then allow for unrestricted time and cohort fixed effects. Our results are robust to the alternative
approaches of including a full-set of age, cohort and time fixed effects and arbitrarily dropping
one additional cohort effect – or requiring the cohort-effects to sum to zero (Deaton, 1997). To
adjust for cohort compositional differences, we include the X set of covariates at the level of our
unit of analysis. In particular, we adjust for the average share of immigrants, male graduates,
black males, married males and females per cohort in the region over the sample period.
The unemployment rate is measured at the time of labour market entry. We consider
dynamic effects by generalising equation (1) to permit the main coefficient of interest β on the 
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initial unemployment rate may vary with labour market experience if early scarring effects erode
as time since labour market entry increases:
crtεcrtγX]LMEtcr,Urate*e)[I(Expeβg(a)tαrαcαcrtln(crime)
E
1e


(2)
Hence, we allow β to vary with potential labour market experience (Exp, for experience groups e 
= 1…. E) and measure the extent to which any effect of initial unemployment on criminal
behavior persists as length of time since labour market entry increases.
Our identification therefore comes from the within-cohort variation in entry unemployment
rates across states/regions. We view this as the most convincing evidence that could be produced
with the available data and therefore forms the basis of most of our results. However it could be
argued that removing the aggregate national unemployment rate at entry (which follows from
including cohort fixed effects) removes much of the variation over time. To address this, we also
report specifications using the national unemployment rate at labour market entry and including a
linear cohort trend to account for changing cohort quality.
Details of US Micro Data
The micro data on US incarceration of individuals comes from US decennial Census and
American Community Survey (ACS) data. We sample all males aged 18-39 from the 5 percent
samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012 ACS from IPUMS-USA (the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series). We identify the institutionalized population using the
Group Quarters variable.
However, it is the case that only in the 1980 sample is the Group Quarters variable
available at a detailed enough level to uniquely identify those in correctional facilities. In
subsequent Censuses (and the ACS), the institutionalized population includes the following
categories: correctional facilities, nursing homes and mental hospitals, and juvenile institutions.
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Fortunately for our purposes, the share of the total institutionalized population accounted for by
those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample (see Data Appendix for discussion). The
additional covariates from the Census include race, marital status, veteran status and education.
Details of US Panel Data
For the panel analysis, our measure of criminality is arrests. Use of arrests data is driven by
two considerations. First, consistent annual incarceration data at the state and cohort level simply
do not exist in the United States (see Pfaff, 2011). Second, it is of interest to measure criminality
in a broad way and check that the results are robust. We therefore use arrest data from the FBI
Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The UCR reports the number of arrests by year, state, age,
gender and type of crime. Our sample runs for all years from 1980 to 2010.
We obtain the number of arrests for property and violent crimes by respectively
aggregating arrests over crime types. Our measure for property crime includes arrests for
burglary, larceny, vehicle theft and arson, while our measure for violent crime includes arrests for
murder, rape, robbery and assault. We produce arrest rates by dividing the number of arrests by
the annual population in the observational unit, and scale by 1,000. Population data is retrieved
from the US Census population estimates.
We restrict the sample to males aged between 16 and 39, as this is the group of individuals
with the highest crime propensity. The original data are grouped by age. Up to the age of 24 the
data are reported by single age year, while for ages 25 and above the data are grouped in five-
year age brackets (25-29, 30-34, 35-39). As our empirical strategy exploits year-of-birth cohorts,
we assume that year-of-birth cohorts within the age groups 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 are
homogeneous in terms of arrest rates. We then construct the number of arrests for single-year-of-
birth cohorts within these age groups by dividing the number of arrests by five.
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Since data for some states are systematically missing, we exclude these states from our
analysis.5 States with missing data for a limited number of years only are included for the non-
missing years, leading to an unbalanced panel.6 There is however no evidence to suggest that the
states that do not report data differ significantly in terms of entry unemployment rates. We also
exclude state-year observations that cover arrests for less than 95 percent of the state population
in that year.
For both the Census and UCR data, our samples comprise year-of-birth cohorts that run
from 1941 to 1994.7 Assuming that individuals enter the labour market at age 16, we consider
unemployment rates at labour market entry from 1957 to 2010. We use data on state annual
insured unemployment rates from 1957 until 2010.8
Two issues may arise with these data. First, since we link the current arrest rate for a
particular cohort in a given state to the initial entry unemployment rate of that cohort in the same
state, we assume that cohorts do not substantially move across states over time. So for example,
we assume that the criminal behavior of the 30 year-old cohort in California in the year 2000 is
affected by the unemployment rate in California in the year 1986, when that cohort entered the
labour market. The empirical validity of this is subject to no inter-state mobility since school-
leaving age. If there is mobility but it is random since school exit, the estimates will merely be
noisy. However if mobility is driven by self-selection, the coefficient of interest may be biased.
Following Dahl (2002) we present robustness tests based on mobility data from the US Census.
5 Excluded states are: Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Washington. As an example, New York is excluded since New York City (the
NYPD) systematically does not report arrests, and thus arrest data at state level would be heavily undercounted.
6 For example, Florida does report arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Thus, we include Florida in our sample
until 1995.
7 Our first year of data on arrests/incarceration is 1980 and the oldest age we consider is 39, so this cohort was born
in 1941. Similarly our data ends in 2010 and the youngest age is 16 (i.e. the 1994 birth-cohort).
8 The downside of using that kind of data is that it does not allow us to distinguish between total and youth
unemployment rates at labour market entry, nor provide measures of the duration of unemployment.
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Second, we use age 16 to identify the entry year into the labour market. We justify that
assumption by the observation that the majority of arrested criminals have low educational
attainment and generally do leave school at or around the compulsory school leaving age. In the
US Census data we use in our microdata analysis, 86 percent of those incarcerated over the 1980-
2010 sample had high school or less (<=12 years of education) as their highest level of education.
Clearly we would like to restrict the arrest sample to those who left school at the compulsory
school-leaving age but such data is not available as we do not know education levels of those
arrested. Our results are likely to be biased downward as a result. Of course, with the Census data
we can separately identify those who finished school at the compulsory school-leaving age and
we do indeed show that the effects are more substantial for the less educated.
Details of UK Micro Data
Our micro-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS is a
large (45,000 individuals) annual cross-section survey used to construct measures of crime
victimization. Each year, a sub-sample of respondents is asked whether they have ever been
arrested by the police. There is no information on the type of crime for which they were arrested,
or on the eventual outcome. However as we will use conviction data in the UK panel analysis, it
is useful to have an alternative measure of criminal behaviour (as in Lochner and Moretti, 2004)
to evaluate robustness. We have a broad array of personal characteristics including educational
attainment, ethnicity, marital status, housing status and employment and income measures.
Details of UK Panel Data
Crime data for the UK panel come from the Offenders Index Database (OID) and the Police
National Computer (PNC). The measure of crime is convictions. This has the advantage of
capturing actual offenders (subject of course to wrongful conviction) rather than the proportion of
14
a particular cohort that come into contact with the police. The OID/PNC provides data on gender,
date of birth, region of conviction and offence category. This data sample runs from 1980 to
2010.
We obtain the number of convictions for property and violent crimes by aggregating
convictions over crime types. As such, our measure for property crime includes burglary, theft
and handling stolen goods and criminal damage, while our measure for violent crime includes
violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery. We produce conviction rates by
dividing the number of convictions by the annual population in the observational unit, and scale
by 1,000. Population data is taken from the ONS population estimates. As with the US data, the
sample covers convictions from 1980 to 2010 for 16-39 year-old males. Individual year-of-birth
cohorts again therefore run from 1941 until 1994. Assuming that individuals enter the labour
market at age 169, we consider unemployment rates at labour market entry from 1957 until 2010.
The unemployment rate data from 1975 onwards comes from the Labour Force Survey. Prior to
1975 the unemployment rate is derived from the claimant count data.
4. Individual-Level Evidence
(a) United States
We begin the analysis with the US incarceration data. We use state-at-birth to identify the
state in which the individual went to school (Dahl, 2002) and so restrict the data to those born in
the United States. Table 1, Panel A reports the key regression results on the Census micro data.
Column (1) reports the results for the full sample of males aged 18-39 whilst the subsequent three
columns focus on samples defined by educational attainment. All regressions include a full set of
9 Year of labour market entry is assumed to be 15 for those leaving school by 1972 and 16 for those leaving from
1973 onward to reflect the change in compulsory school leaving age from 15 to 16 introduced in the UK in 1973.
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year, state of residence, state of birth and cohort effects, a quartic in age and controls for race,
education, marital status and veteran status.
The estimated coefficient on entry unemployment in column (1) is 0.031. The mean of the
dependent variable is 0.028 (i.e. 2.8 percent of males aged 18-39 are incarcerated). So entering
the labour market in a time of recession (defined as the unemployment rate being 5 percentage
points higher than normal) results in a 5.5 percent increase in the probability of being
incarcerated at some point over the next two decades.
However we can see from the subsequent columns that this effect is almost entirely due to
the high-school dropouts. A recession increases this group’s probability of incarceration by 7
percent, from an already high mean of 8.4 percent. These are sizeable effects when we realize
that this is averaged over more than twenty years of the individual’s post-school experience.
Finally, in columns (3) and (4) we see only weak effects for those who successfully
graduate from high school and no effect at all for those with 4-years of college – who should not
of course be affected by the unemployment rate at the compulsory school-leaving age. The results
in Panel B show that redefining the 1980 measure of incarceration by explicitly excluding those
not in correctional facilities (see the Data Appendix for discussion) does not alter our
conclusions.
(b) United Kingdom
For the UK, we look at the individual-level data on self-reported arrests. The data provide
information on the age at which the respondent left full-time education and so allow us to
precisely date the year of labour market entry. The data also provide an extensive set of personal
characteristics, which we would expect to be correlated with criminal activity. There are two key
disadvantages in using this micro data. First, the usual concern associated with the self-reporting
16
of arrests. In the context of this study however, this would only bias our estimates if the self-
reporting probability varied within a cohort depending on the initial entry unemployment rate. It
seems to us hard to make such a case. Second, we have no information of when the arrest
occurred – the question is simply whether the individual has ever been arrested. So this micro
data allows us to estimate the average impact of initial entry unemployment on all future criminal
behaviour but does not allow us to investigate the time pattern of the persistence of such effects.
We estimate probit models with the dependent variable taking the value one if the
respondent reports having ever been arrested by the police. We include survey year dummies and
an extensive set of personal controls. Table 2 reports the results. Column (1) shows an estimated
significant positive coefficient on the entry unemployment rate – a recession (again defined as a 5
percentage points higher than normal unemployment rate) is thus associated with a 5.7 percent
increase in the probability of ever being arrested.
In the second column we restrict attention to those whose highest educational qualification
was achieved at age 16 and therefore definitely left education at age 16. Here we can more
closely link exit from education and the initial unemployment rate and this is likely a sample that
contains a larger fraction of individuals at risk of criminal behaviour. As expected, we find a
substantially larger and more strongly identified impact of entry unemployment for this group – a
recession raises the probability of ever being arrested by 8 percent for this group.
In the final column we conduct a placebo-type experiment. We examine the arrest record of
individuals who report educational qualifications that required school attendance at least to age
18. This group should not have been directly affected by the unemployment rate when they were
16. Sure enough we no longer find a positive effect for these individuals – indeed the estimated
coefficient on the entry unemployment rate is indistinguishable from zero.
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5. Panel Data Evidence
(a) United States
We begin our analysis of the panel data for the US by presenting evidence on the average
effect of initial labour market conditions on criminal activity. In terms of the equations above,
this specification is equation (1) which restricts the coefficient β to be the same across experience 
groups, and is therefore equivalent to the specification used in the Census results of Table 1.
Table 3 shows the results. The dependent variable is the log of the crime rate, where the crime
rate is defined using arrest rates as explained above. Columns (1), (3) and (5) consider the
national unemployment rate at labour market entry while columns (2), (4) and (6) use the state
unemployment rate at labour market entry (our preferred specification). All regressions include
year and state fixed effects, a quartic function in age and cohort composition variables.10 The
national results control for a linear cohort trend while the state results include a full set of cohort
fixed effects. The regressions are weighted by cell-population and robust standard errors are
clustered at the state-cohort level.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 show a strong positive estimated coefficient on the entry
unemployment rate, whether we exploit the national or state-level variation in entry
unemployment. The average arrest rate for a cohort entering the labour market in a recession is
estimated to be around 7.5 percent higher than for a similar cohort entering into a normal labour
market (again using a 5 percentage point increase in unemployment). The effect is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
This is a substantial estimate of labour market entry effects on crime, but in some respects
the average effect of recessions may not be the most relevant parameter of interest. Indeed, within
10 As discussed in Section 3, an alternative to estimating a parametric age function is to include a full-set of age
dummies and arbitrarily drop a further cohort effect. All the results in this paper are robust to this alternative and
results are available upon request.
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a cohort, there will be a substantial share for which the marginal effect is zero, since their optimal
decision will be unaffected – i.e. they are at an interior solution that results in no illegal behaviour
and the recession does not move them across the threshold. Thus the average effect that we
estimate is a combination of a zero effect for potentially a large share of the cohort and a
substantial effect for those close to the legal/illegal threshold in the absence of a recession. The
results from the analysis of the Census data suggest that substantial effects are likely for the less
educated. The remaining columns show results for property crime and violent crime, using both
national and state unemployment variation. The results suggest very similar and statistically
significant effects in all cases. In all subsequent results we report only those that use state-level
unemployment rates as we view this as providing the most convincing identification.11
Table 3 demonstrated a statistically significant and economically substantial effect of initial
unemployment conditions on the average arrest rate of cohorts over their entire lifetime,
consistent with the incarceration results of Table 1. But we are also interested in examining the
persistence of this effect: is the entry unemployment effect primarily driven by a very large
impact on crime in the early years after labour market entry that subsides as the young age and go
on to establish a stable legal career? Or is the effect persistent, with some of those affected by
harsh labour market conditions at labour market entry pushed into a criminal career that becomes
self-perpetuating for the reasons discussed in Section 2? In order to examine this, we allow the
coefficient on initial unemployment to vary by years since labour market entry as outlined in
equation (2) of section 3.
We group experience into four categories (0-5 years, 6-11 years, 12-17 years and 18-23
years) and use an identical regression specification as in the previous table. The results are shown
11 Appendix Table A2 shows estimates using more disaggregated measures of crime types and finds there to be
significant positive effects on all crimes except murder.
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in Table 4 with column (1) showing results for all crimes, and columns (2) and (3) for property
and violent crime respectively. There are strong positive effects of entry unemployment on
arrests in the early years in the labour market, that fall as experience increases. However even a
decade after leaving school, there are strong positive effects from entry unemployment on arrests,
particularly for property crime. Juveniles who leave school in a recession have higher arrest rates
during their first few years in the labour market and higher arrests rates over a decade later than
juveniles who leave school in a buoyant economy.
An alternative specification to examine the persistence of entry unemployment is to allow
for the interaction term with experience to vary with individual years of experience (rather than
group experience as done in Table 4). Figure 2 plots the estimated coefficients (together with 95
percent confidence intervals) for every year of labour market experience. Again, the drop in the
effect after the first few years of labour market entry is clear but the individual year estimates
suggest a consistent longer lasting scarring effect.
As previously discussed, one may be concerned about inter-state mobility in the data. The
issue is what is the correct entry unemployment rate for cohort c at time t in state s? Thus far we
have assumed it was the unemployment rate in state s at the time that cohort c left high-school.
But this ignores mobility. Some of those in cohort c at time t in state s will have completed high-
school in state k and entered the labour market there. For this part of the cohort, the correct entry
unemployment rate is of course the unemployment rate in state k at the time cohort c left high-
school. Dahl (2002) makes the same point with respect to estimates of state-specific returns to
education, which differ substantially across states. His proposed solution to this mobility problem
is to use reported migration flows across states to correct the estimated returns. We follow
broadly the same procedure here. We use the 5 percent US Census for 1980, 1990 and 2000 and
20
the 2010 ACS to calculate for each cohort c in state s the distribution of states-of-birth. Assuming
that state-of-birth and state-at-16 are highly correlated, we generate a mobility-adjusted entry
unemployment rate for cohort c in state s as:
ck
50k
0k
cskcs upu 


(3)
where p is the proportion of cohort c in state s that were born in state k.
Table 5 reports estimates using this mobility-adjusted entry unemployment rate. The results
for property crime seem to be robust to the new specification, whereas the results for violent
crime are substantially larger in magnitude. Hence, we appear to underestimate the effect of
initial unemployment at labour market entry on criminal behavior with respect to violent crime
when we do not adjust for inter-regional mobility.
Our final robustness test questions whether it is the unemployment rate at labour market
entry that principally matters or whether unemployment rates across a cohort’s life affect criminal
behaviour. To examine this issue we re-estimate Table 3 but include as additional regressors the
state unemployment rate for each cohort at ages 6, 11, 21 and 26 (in addition to the entry
unemployment rate at age 16). Since unemployment rates within a state over time are highly
auto-correlated we include each of these additional unemployment rates separately. Table 6
shows that the unemployment rate at age 16 is always quantitatively the most important measure
but there is clearly evidence that the unemployment rate at other points in the life-cycle matter.
This is an interesting question for future research, though we suspect more complete life histories
of individuals would be required for deeper analysis.
(b) United Kingdom
We begin in Table 7 with the same specification reported in Table 3 for the US. Recall that
this estimates the average effect of initial labour market conditions on criminal activity, in this
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case convictions rather than arrests. As with Table 3, we report estimates for total crime and for
property and violent crime separately and using either the national or region-specific entry
unemployment rate. The only specification difference is that we allow cohort composition effects
to have different coefficients in London compared to the rest of the UK. The differences in these
estimated coefficients are statistically significant, suggesting that over time cohort composition
and their effects on crime have differed substantially between London and the rest of the UK.12
As with the US results, we find a statistically significant effect of entry unemployment on
overall lifetime crime. Taking the estimated coefficient in Column (2), a recession that raises the
unemployment rate by 5 percentage points would raise the lifetime conviction rate by 4 percent.
Interestingly, this estimate is almost identical to that for the US incarceration results. We might
of course expect the effect on conviction and incarceration to be somewhat less than on arrests.13
Next we examine the persistence of the entry unemployment effect. As in Table 4 for the
US, we split the data into four experience groups (0-5 years, 6-11 years, 12-17 years and 18-23
years) and allow the entry effect to differ across the experience groups. Table 8 shows there to be
a strongly persistent effect of entry unemployment on subsequent criminal convictions. Once
again, the key message is that high entry unemployment contributes to significantly higher crime
rates among affected cohorts that are long-lasting. Over a decade after entry, conviction rates
remain significantly higher. For property crime, the influence eventually dies out after 15-20
12 An alternative would be to estimate the models using the regional dimension outside of London only. Results
available on request show that this generates the same qualitative results as reported in the main text, though the
precision tends to be somewhat higher. We prefer to include London and control directly for differences in the effect
of cohort composition.
13 We are somewhat skeptical about the magnitude of the effect when using national entry unemployment as the
source of identification. The difficulty arises because we have to assume a specific functional form for the cohort
effect whereas when regional entry unemployment is used we can non-parametrically control for the cohort effect
since identification comes from within-cohort variation across regions. To see the sensitivity of the results to this,
note that the coefficient on national entry unemployment in column (1) of Table 7 is 2.678 (0.189) when we allow a
quadratic cohort trend. If instead we allow a quartic cohort trend this coefficient drops to 1.030 (0.189).
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years post-school experience while it remains (and indeed becomes quantitatively more
significant) for violent crime.
Figure 3 shows the year-by-year effect of entry unemployment as a cohort spends more
time in the labour market. One key difference between the time-profile of the experience effects
for the UK and the US is that the entry unemployment effect for 16 and 17 year olds is
substantially higher than the average entry unemployment effect in the US, but not in the UK. An
obvious explanation for this rests with our measure of criminality in the two countries. In the US
we use arrests while we use convictions in the UK. It seems likely that the detrimental effects of
entry unemployment will take substantially more time to feed through to convictions than to
arrests – youths may be frequently arrested but avoid the courts until a tipping point has been
reached. In any event, the effects are very similar across the two countries from age 18 onwards.
Table 9 focuses on whether all recessions are alike. A feature of the labour market common
to European countries over the last forty years, but almost completely absent for the US (until the
Great Recession) has been the incidence of long-term unemployment. We might expect, and the
model of Mocan et al. (2005) predicts, that recessions characterized by rising rates of long-term
unemployment would be much worse for potential scaring. Of course initially, a rising duration
for the stock of currently unemployed is positive for new entrants since the stock of unemployed
provide less competition for available vacancies, but we might expect this effect to be fleeting
before the negative effects of unemployment duration on new entrants takes its toll. To examine
this we divide the entry unemployment rate into the short-term and long-term unemployment
rate. Short-term unemployment covers all those with a current unemployment spell of less than
twelve months. For our entire sample, the average unemployment rate of 7.4 percent is made up
of a short-term rate of 4.6 percent and a long-term rate of 2.8 percent. The results of Table 9
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show strongly that it is deep and long recessions characterized by high long-term unemployment
that are particularly problematic.
Finally, we again examine unemployment rate effects across the cohort life-cycle. We
include unemployment rates at ages 6, 11, 21 and 26 in addition to the entry unemployment rate
at 16. Table 10 shows that for most alternatives, the entry unemployment rate effect remains
robust and the unemployment rate at other ages are generally insignificant. The exception is the
age 11 unemployment rate which is strongly significant and eliminates the significance of the
entry unemployment effect. We note two things about this. First, the unemployment rate at entry
is most auto-correlated with that at age 11 (correlation coefficient of 0.63), which makes separate
identification difficult. There is nothing obviously special about age 11 - if we replaced the age
11 unemployment rate with ages 12, 13 etc. we find that the coefficient is almost the same on all
of these alternatives. Second, we would not be surprised if there were some effect from pre-
labour market entry conditions on criminal careers. Youths see high unemployment in their area
in their early teens as an indicator of their likely success in the labour market when leaving
school.
6. Conclusions
We have presented the first evidence that recessions can lead to substantial and persistently
higher rates of criminal behavior among those likely to be most impacted by such conditions –
those newly entering the labour market. In contrast to much of the evidence on the long-run effect
of initial unemployment on wages and career trajectories, we find that the effect on criminal
behaviour remains substantial, though attenuated, many years after labour market entry. In effect,
we show that recessions can produce career criminals. This is the case from empirical analysis
based upon US and UK data, both at the level of the individual and for age/birth cohorts over
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time. This demonstrates a rather more disturbing long-run effect of recessions, and adds to the
research picture that the state of the business cycle when people leave school and enter the labour
market can have profound and sizable impacts on economic and social outcomes across their life.
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Figure 1a: Male Offender Rates by Age, US
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Figure 1b: Male Offender Rates by Age, UK
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Figure 2: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, US
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Figure 3: Entry Unemployment Effects By Experience, UK
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Table 1: US Census/ACS Incarceration Regressions, 1980-2010
Sample:
(1)
All Males
(2)
HS Dropouts
(3)
HS Grads
(4)
4yr College
A. Aged 18 And Over
State Entry U Rate 0.031**
(0.015)
0.120**
(0.053)
0.017
(0.025)
-0.004
(0.009)
B. Aged 18 And Over,
1980 Redefined
State Entry U Rate 0.026*
(0.015)
0.137***
(0.052)
0.013
(0.024)
-0.010
(0.008)
N 5,760,227 798,692 2,553,430 1,169,645
Year Effects x x x x
State Effects x x x x
State/Race Effects x x x x
Cohort Effects x x x x
State of Birth Effects x x x x
Age Quartic x x x x
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the individual is institutionalized and 0 otherwise. Sample
covers males aged 18-39 who are not in school, and born in the United States. Entry unemployment is the
unemployment rate at age 16 in the state of birth. Data are from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 5 percent IPUMS US
Census and the 2008-2012 IPUMS ACS. Regressions also include marital status, race, education and veteran status
indicators. Standard errors are clustered at the state/cohort level and regressions are weighted with the Census person
weight.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 2: UK Self Reported Arrest Regressions, 2001/2 to 2010/11
(1) (2) (3)
Ever Arrested Ever Arrested,
Age 16
Qualification
Ever Arrested,
Age 18+
Qualification
Region Entry U rate 0.246** 0.508*** 0.050
(0.123) (0.159) (0.208)
Year Dummies x x x
Personal Controls x x x
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.215 0.303 0.164
Sample Size 22,646 7,984 9,166
Notes: Table reports estimated marginal effects from a probit. Personal controls include age (10 categories), ethnic
group (5 categories), education (9 categories where appropriate), student status, marital status (4 categories), income
(18 categories), economic status (15 categories), number of children (10 categories), housing tenure (8 categories),
years at address (9 categories), years in area (9 categories), and government office region (10 categories). The
sample covers ages 16 to 65 of pooled British Crime Surveys, 2001-2002 to 2010-2011. Regressions use individual
sample weights. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the government office region level
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
34
Table 3: US Cohort Panel, Basic Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent
National Entry U rate 2.195*** 1.624*** 1.995***
(0.388) (0.526) (0.367)
State Entry U rate 1.538*** 1.646*** 1.656***
(0.378) (0.511) (0.439)
State Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Linear Cohort Trend x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Quartic in Age x x x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487
Notes: Dependent variable is the log arrested male offender rate from the UCR. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run from 1941-
1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 16. All insured unemployment rates are measured in the year of
labour market entry. Sample runs from 1980-2010. All regressions include a quartic in age and state and year fixed effects. We
include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men,
married men and females per cohort in that state 1980-2010). National-level estimates use the cohort-level national
unemployment rate at labour market entry and include a cohort linear trend. State-level estimates use cohort-level state
unemployment rates and include cohort fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are
weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 4: US Cohort Panel, Effects by Labour Market Experience Groups
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Type: All Property Violent
State Entry U Rate*Exp(0-5) 3.201*** 1.868*** 4.385***
(0.612) (0.613) (0.942)
State Entry U Rate*Exp(6-11) 1.398*** 1.556*** 2.238***
(0.496) (0.569) (0.667)
State Entry U Rate*Exp(12-17) 1.351*** 1.615** 1.101*
(0.485) (0.640) (0.572)
State Entry U Rate*Exp(18-23) 1.009** 1.604** 0.370
(0.485) (0.700) (0.553)
State Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x
Compositional adjustment x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,487 19,487
Notes: Dependent variable is the log arrested male offender rate from the UCR. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 16 and experience is defined as years since
entering the labour market. The experience interacting variable is a dummy taking on value of 1 if the years of
experience are as indicated and 0 otherwise. All insured unemployment rates are measured in the year of labour
market entry. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments
(average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men, married men and females per cohort in that state 1980-
2010). All regressions include year, cohort, and region fixed effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are
clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 5: US Cohort Panel, With Mobility Adjustment
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Type: All Property Violent
Mobility Adjusted State Entry U rate 1.868*** 1.487** 2.643***
(0.523) (0.666) (0.662)
State Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Quartic in Age x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,487 19,487
Notes: Dependent variable is the log arrested male offender rate from the UCR. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 16. All insured unemployment rates are
measured in year of labour market entry and are adjusted for measured mobility as discussed in the main text.
Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of
immigrants, male graduates, black men, married men and females per cohort in that state 1980-2010). All regressions
include state, year, and cohort fixed effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level
and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 6: US Cohort Panel, Including Entry Unemployment Rates at Different Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime Type: All All All All
State Entry U Rate 1.771*** 1.418*** 1.186*** 1.049**
(0.390) (0.382) (0.355) (0.349)
State Entry U Rate at Age 6 1.094**
(0.334)
State Entry U Rate at Age 11 0.676**
(0.322)
State Entry U Rate at Age 21 1.040**
(0.444)
State Entry U Rate at Age 26 0.429
(0.418)
State Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Quartic in Age x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,487 19,175 18,275
Notes: Dependent variable is the log arrested male offender rate from the UCR. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 16. Insured unemployment rates are
measured in the year of labour market entry and at ages 6, 11, 21 and 26. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include
control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men,
married men and females per cohort in that state 1980-2010). All regressions include year, cohort, and region fixed
effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the
male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 7: UK Cohort Panel, Basic Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crime Type: All All Property Property Violent Violent
National Entry U Rate 2.678***
(0.189)
3.456***
(0.249)
0.708***
(0.180)
Regional Entry U Rate 0.812***
(0.277)
0.713**
(0.349)
1.375***
(0.328)
Region Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x
Quadratic Cohort Effect x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Quartic in Age x x x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,440 7,426 7,426
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 15/16. All unemployment rates are measured
in year of labour market entry. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for cohort compositional
adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and married men in each cohort/region,
1980-2010), allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All regressions include year, cohort, and
region fixed effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the region-cohort level and regressions are
weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 8: UK Cohort Panel, Effects by Labour Market Experience Groups
(1) (2) (3)
All Property Violent
Regional Entry U Rate*Exp(0-5) 0.861*** 0.797** 0.990**
(0.305) (0.349) (0.486)
Regional Entry U Rate*Exp(6-11) 0.914*** 1.012*** 0.898**
(0.284) (0.350) (0.396)
Regional Entry U Rate*Exp(12-17) 0.832** 0.776* 1.300***
(0.343) (0.437) (0.371)
Regional Entry U Rate*Exp(18-23) 0.583 0.111 2.603***
(0.369) (0.456) (0.414)
Region Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Age Fixed Effects x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x
Sample Size 7,440 7,440 7,426
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1993. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 15/16 and experience is defined as years
since entering the labour market. The experience interacting variable is a dummy taking on value of 1 if the years of
experience are as indicated and 0 otherwise. All unemployment rates are measured in year of labour market entry.
Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of
immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and married men per cohort in that region, 1980-2010), allowing for
differential effects of composition in London. All regressions include year, cohort, age and region fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 9: UK Cohort Panel, Including Short- and Long-Term Entry Unemployment Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Crime Type: All Property Violent
Regional Entry Short-Term U Rate -1.159* -0.985 -1.753**
(0.622) (0.769) (0.841)
Regional Entry Long-Term U Rate 1.674*** 1.462*** 2.731***
(0.372) (0.474) (0.443)
Region Fixed Effects x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x
Quartic in Age x x x
Compositional adjustment x x x
Sample Size 7,430 7,430 7,416
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1993. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 15/16. All unemployment rates are measured
in year of labour market entry. Short-term unemployment covers those with durations less than 12 months, long-term
unemployment are durations longer than 12 months. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for
cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and married men per
cohort in that region, 1980-2010), allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All regressions include
year, cohort, and region fixed effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the region-cohort level and
regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Table 10: UK Cohort Panel, Including Entry Unemployment Rates at Different Ages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Entry U rate 0.792*** 0.405 0.813*** 0.682**
(0.277) (0.278) (0.281) (0.287)
Entry U Rate at Age 6 0.585
(0.363)
Entry U Rate at Age 11 1.298***
(0.282)
Entry U Rate at Age 21 -0.078
(0.280)
Entry U Rate at Age 26 0.247
(0.282)
State Fixed Effects x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x
Quartic in Age x x x x
Compositional adjustment x x x x
Sample Size 7,430 7,440 7,290 6,890
Notes: Dependent variable is the log male conviction rate from the OID/PNC. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 15/16. Unemployment rates are measured in
the year of labour market entry and at ages 6, 11, 21 and 26. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control
variables for cohort compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, nonwhite men and
married men in each cohort/region, 1980-2010), allowing for differential effects of composition in London. All
regressions include year, cohort, and region fixed effects and a quartic in age. Standard errors are clustered at the
region-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
42
Appendix 1: Additional Tables
Table A1: US Male Population in Group Quarters by Type and Age, 1980-2010
Total Institutionalized Correctional Institutions Correctional as Percent of
Total
1980 Census
All 1232120 439720 35.7
15-17 68300 8460 12.4
18-21 123320 89600 72.7
22-24 104060 80240 77.1
25-39 301980 205780 68.1
1990 Census
All 1801350 1030210 57.2
15-17 68480 16490 24.1
18-21 149780 128940 86.1
22-24 143890 133490 92.8
25-39 666690 581670 87.2
2000 Census
All 2534060 1806260 71.3
15-17 87200 18960 21.7
18-21 221660 202470 91.3
22-24 201060 195660 97.3
25-39 951660 911050 95.7
2010 Census
All 2716877 2059020 75.8
15-19 153924 74720 48.5
20-24 327760 308926 94.3
25-39 971581 945065 97.3
Notes: Data from 1980 are calculated from IPUMS data, figures for 1990, 2000 and 2010 come from the US Census
Bureau.
43
Table A2: US Cohort Panel, Detailed Crime Types
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Crime Type: Violent Property
Murder Rape Robbery Assault Burglary Theft
(Larceny
&
Vehicle)
Arson
State Entry U Rate -2.473* 2.646** 1.668** 1.642** 2.371** 3.112** 3.361**
(1.032) (0.524) (0.630) (0.528) (0.564) (0.636) (0.619)
State Fixed Effects x x x x x x x
Year Fixed Effects x x x x x x x
Cohort Fixed Effects x x x x x x x
Quartic in Age x x x x x x x
Compositional Adjustment x x x x x x x
Sample Size 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487 19,487
Notes: Dependent variable is the log arrested male offender rate from the UCR. Individual year-of-birth cohorts run
from 1941-1994. We assume that cohorts enter the labour market at age 16. All insured unemployment rates are
measured in year of labour market entry. Sample runs from 1980-2010. We include control variables for cohort
compositional adjustments (average share of immigrants, male graduates, black men, married men and females per
cohort in that state 1980-2010). All regressions include year, cohort, and state fixed effects and a quartic in age.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-cohort level and regressions are weighted by the male cell-population.
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level.
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level.
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level.
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Appendix 2: Data Description
A. United States
A1. Micro Data on Incarceration
The micro data on US incarceration comes from the US Census. We sample all males aged 16-39
from the 5 percent IPUMS for the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Census and the 2008-2012 American
Community Survey (ACS). We identify the institutionalized population using the Group Quarters
(GQ) variable. The GQ variable consistently identifies the following categories:
a) Non-group quarter households;
b) Institutions (Correctional Institutions, Mental Institutions, Institutions for the elderly,
handicapped and poor);
c) Non-institutional group quarters (Military, College dormitory, rooming house, other).
However only in the 1980 IPUMS is the GQ variable detailed enough to uniquely identify those
in correctional facilities. In subsequent Censuses (and the ACS), the institutionalized population
includes the following categories: correctional facilities, nursing homes and mental hospitals, and
juvenile institutions. However, the share of the total institutionalized population accounted for by
those in correctional facilities is very high in our sample.
Appendix Table A1 shows the institutionalized male population by GQ type and age. Note that
this data comes from published aggregate Census reports that do break up the categories, though
this is not available in the IPUMS data release. In 2000, for example, 95.3 percent of
institutionalized males aged 18-39 where in correctional facilities. Two key points come from
Table A1. First, incarcerated males aged less than 18 are much less well identified (since juvenile
facilities are an important component for this group). We therefore restrict our analysis of the
Census data to those aged 18-39. Second, the 1980 Census has a less tight correspondence
between institutionalization and incarceration. Fortunately, this is the one Census that has the full
GQ coding in the micro files, so as a robustness test we use only the correctional facility
definition in the 1980 Census. In the main specification we prefer to use the broader
institutionalized measure across all years to maintain consistency. This approach is the same as
that used by Borjas, Grogger and Hanson (2010).
A2. Panel Data on Arrests
Panel data for the US come from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). The measure of crime
is arrests. The UCR reports the number of arrests by year, state, age, gender and type of crime.
The original data identifies the number of arrests by law enforcement agencies within states. We
construct a state-level panel on arrests by aggregating the number of arrests over law enforcement
agencies within a state. Within the UCR, data for certain states are systematically missing either
for the whole state or for important law enforcement agencies within that state. For example,
New York City systematically does not report arrest numbers which implies that New York state
level counts on arrests would be heavily undercounted if we simply aggregated the number of
arrests over all reporting agencies. Hence, we exclude the following states from our sample:
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Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, South Dakota and Washington.
Data for some states are missing for a limited number of years only. For example, Florida reports
arrests until 1995, but not afterwards. Since there is no evidence that would suggest that these
states differ significantly in terms of unemployment rates, we exclude the respective years only
and keep the non-missing years of these states as observations in the sample, leading to an
unbalanced sample. In the example above that means that we include Florida in our sample until
1995. In addition, the UCR reports the total population for each law enforcement agency in the
reported year. Aggregating the UCR population count to the state-year level and comparing that
number to official population counts allows us to identify state-year observations that cover
arrests for less than 95 percent of the state population. Since these arrest counts are likely to
underreport the true number of arrests in that state and year, we exclude the respective
observations from our sample. Whenever single state-year observations are missing in the
resulting sample, we impute values using a linear interpolation method. Our results are robust to
excluding imputed observations.
We sample males aged 16 to 39 from 1980 to 2010. The UCR data are grouped by age category.
From age 16 up to the age of 24, the number of arrests is measured by single age year. For ages
25 and above, the arrests are aggregated to the number of arrests in a five-year age bracket, i.e. 25
to 29, 30 to 34, and 35 to 39. In order to be able to track the number of arrests per year-of-birth
cohort, we therefore disaggregate the arrest measure to the number of arrests by single age year
by dividing the arrest count by five. The underlying assumption is that year-of-birth cohorts are
homogenous in terms of the number of arrests within the respective age bracket. Following the
literature, we categorize arrests into property and violent crime using the UCR offense code
variable as follows:
Violent crime: Property crime:
01A = Murder and non-negligent manslaughter 05 = Burglary – breaking or entering
01B = Manslaughter by negligence 06 = Larceny – theft (except motor vehicle)
02 = Forcible rape 07 = Motor vehicle theft
03 = Robbery 09 = Arson
04 = Aggravated assault
08 = Other assaults
In order to produce arrest rates, we aggregate the number of arrests for the above categories and
divide the resulting number of arrests by the annual state-age-year population. The population
data for that purpose are retrieved from the US Census population estimates. We scale our arrest
rates by 1,000 in order to ease the interpretation of our results.
A3. Entry Unemployment Rates
We assume the age of labour market entry to be 16 for the whole sample. The year-of-birth
cohorts in both the Census and the UCR samples run from 1941 to 1994: The first year of
observation is 1980 with the oldest cohort aged 39, i.e. born in 1941. The last year of observation
is 2010 with the youngest cohort aged 16, i.e. born in 1994. As we want to measure
unemployment rates in the year of labour market entry, we consider unemployment rates from
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1957 to 2010, covering the calendar years of each cohort in the sample at age 16. We use data on
state-level annual insured unemployment rates from 1957 until 2010. The data are available from
the Unemployment Insurance Financial Data Handbook provided by the US Department of
Labour, Employment & Training Administration on their website. Unfortunately, that kind of
data does not allow us to disaggregate entry unemployment rates by age, nor to provide measures
of the duration of unemployment. As an alternative, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
provides state level unemployment rates based on the Current Population Survey (CPS) from
1977 onwards, to which we data read from the graphs in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) back
to 1963. This robustness check yields very similar results to the use of insured unemployment
rates.
B. United Kingdom
B1. Micro Data on Arrests
The micro-level data for the UK comes from the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS is a large
(around 45,000 individuals) annual cross-section survey used to construct measures of crime
victimization. It is nationally representative and contains extensive personal demographics. From
2001 onward a sub-sample of respondents complete a supplementary survey that, among other
things, covers contact with law enforcement agencies. In particular, respondents are asked
whether they have ever been arrested by the police. There is however no information on the type
of crime for which they were arrested nor on the eventual outcome. In addition there is no
information on when the arrest occurred i.e. a 65-year old may have been arrested last week or 50
years ago. We sample all males aged 16-65 and allocate the entry unemployment rate (see below)
based on current region of residence and year of reaching 16 years old.
B2. Panel Data on Convictions
Crime data for the UK panel come from the Offenders Index Database (OID) and the Police
National Computer (PNC). The measure of crime is convictions. The OID is a 4-week sample of
all convictions in all courts across England and Wales, with the sample weeks evenly spread
across the year. The data contains a unique personal identifier to allow us to remove multiple
convictions for the same individual (i.e. in a given year an individual is either convicted or not)
and provides data on gender, date of birth, region of conviction (10 regions) and offence
category. This data sample runs from 1980 to 2002. From 2003 to 2010, the OID has been
superseded by the PNC. We do not have access to the micro data of the PNC, but the Ministry of
Justice have provided us with an extract of the number of individuals convicted in each year,
broken down by individual year of age, gender, region of conviction and offence category. This
allows us to merge the two datasets together to produce a panel covering the years 1980 to 2010.
The PNC data is actually provided for the period 2000-2010 which allows us to examine the
overlap between the OID and PNC in 2000-2002. Our analysis of this overlap suggests a very
high concordance between the two sources. We obtain the number of convictions for property
and violent crimes by aggregating convictions over crime types. As such, our measure for
property crime includes burglary, theft and handling of stolen goods and criminal damage, while
our measure for violent crime includes violence against the person, sexual offences and robbery.
We produce conviction rates by dividing the number of convictions by the annual population in
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the observational unit (year-of-birth by region cell), and scale by 1,000. Population data are taken
from the ONS population estimates. As with the US data, the sample covers convictions from
1980 to 2010 for 16-39 year-old males. Individual year-of-birth cohorts again therefore run from
1941 until 1994.
B3. Entry Unemployment Rates
Year of labour market entry is assumed to be 15 for those leaving school by 1972 and 16 for
those leaving from 1973 onward to reflect the change in compulsory school leaving age
introduced in the UK in 1973. Entry unemployment rates are measured at both the national and
regional level. The male unemployment rate data from 1975 onwards comes from the Labour
Force Survey (equivalent to the CPS). Prior to 1975 the unemployment rate is derived from the
claimant count data. This latter measure covers only those registered as unemployed and is
therefore a more narrow definition than that in the Labour Force Survey (which covers all those
actively seeking employment in the previous two weeks). However our unemployment rate is
only measured for males and the discrepancy between the two alternative measures was small
prior to the 1980s.
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